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ABSTRAKSI 
Dalam beberapa tahun terakhir, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) yang menarik 
perhatian peneliti karena struktur yang kuat matematika dan keamanan tertinggi 
dibandingkan dengan algoritma lain yang sudah ada seperti RSA. Tujuan utama 
dalam pekerjaan ini adalah untuk memberikan skema tanda tangan blind novel 
berdasarkan ECC. Keamanan hasil metode yang diusulkan dari ketidaklayakan 
untuk memecahkan logaritma diskrit melalui kurva elips. Dalam tulisan ini kami 
memperkenalkan diusulkan untuk pengembangan skema tanda tangan blind dengan 
kompleksitas dibandingkan dengan skema yang ada. 
Kata Kunci: Kriptografi, Blind Signature, Curve Elliptic, Kebutaan, Untraceability 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has attracted the attention of 
researchers due to its robust mathematical structure and highest security compared to 
other existing algorithm like RSA. Our main objective in this work was to provide a 
novel blind signature scheme based on ECC. The security of the proposed method 
results from the infeasibility to solve the discrete logarithm over an elliptic curve. In 
this paper we introduce a proposed to development the blind signature scheme with 
more complexity as compared to the existing schemes. 
 
Keywords: Cryptography, Blind Signature, Elliptic Curve, Blindness, 
Untraceability. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
With growing importance of sender privacy in various schemes such as 
electronic voting protocol, blind signature schemes are gaining momentum. A blind 
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signature scheme is a protocol allowing the recipient to obtain a valid signature for a 
message, from the signer without him or her seeing the message. Blind signature is a 
form of digital signature in which the signer doesn’t have authority over message, as 
also a third party could able to verify without knowing the secrets of both the parties 
that are involved in signature.  
The concept of blind signature was first introduced by Chaum [1] in 1982. Any 
blind signature must satisfying two properties: Blindness and untraceability [1,2]. 
Blindness means the content of a message should be blind to the signer. 
Untraceability is satisfied if, whenever a blind signature is revealed to the public, the 
signer will be unable to know who the owner of the signature is. 
In the literature, several applications of blind signature schemes have been 
developed through the e-commerce and e-voting fields. In 1995, Camenisch and al. 
[3] proposed a novel blind signature scheme based on the Discrete Logarithm 
Problem (DLP). But it fails the untraceability [5].  
Blind signature scheme suggested by Camenisch and al. has been proved by Lee and 
al. that it does not satisfy correctness property [2]. In 2005, Wu and Wang [6] 
proved the untraceability of the Camenisch and al.'s scheme. They corrected the 
proof of Lee and al. untraceability and concluded that Camenisch and al.'s scheme is 
still more efficient than Lee and al. 
  Later, Jena and al. [7] proposed two novel blind signature schemes nevertheless 
there was no reasonable proof for correctness of their schemes. Recently Fan and al. 
[8] devised an attack on [2,6] schemes such that a signature requester, by performing 
only one round of system, can obtain more than one valid signature. Therefore, a 
novel blind signature scheme is required in this area.  
Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem is accepted to be a secure and efficient public-key 
cryptosystem. In [9], Vanstone had concluded that ECC provided roughly 10 times 
greater efficiency than either integer factorization systems or discrete logarithm 
systems, in terms of computational overheads, key sizes and bandwidth.  
Here we would like to focus on the security of ECC, relying upon the difficulty 
of solving the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. As were the cases with the 
integer factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem modulo p, no 
efficient algorithms are known to solve the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. 
Vanstone [9] states,” the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is believed to be 
harder than both the integer factorization problem and the discrete logarithm 
problem modulo p.” 
In the previous works, we provide the public-key cryptosystems based ECC [10-
13]. Then, we propose a novel signcryption scheme based on the elliptic curve 
discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) [14]. In this paper, a novel blind signature 
scheme based on elliptic curve will be proposed. The rest of the paper is organized 
as follows: Basic concept of elliptic curve (EC) is discussed in Section 2. Our blind 
signature scheme is presented in section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the security 
analysis of the proposed method. Finally, conclusions are made in section 5. 
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2. FUNDAMENTALS OF ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Some fundamentals of elliptic curve cryptography that is essential to understand 
the mathematical descriptions of elliptic curve over finite field Fp used in the 
cryptographic scheme are discussed below: 
• Scalar addition: A new scalar can be obtained as a result of the addition of 
two or more scalars. Common integer addition modulo p is the addition in case 
of Fp. The scalar addition of a and b producing c is given by c = a + b. 
• Scalar Multiplication: A new scalar can be obtained by the multiplication of 
two or more scalars. Common integer multiplication modulo p is the 
multiplication in case of Fp. The scalar multiplication of a and b producing c is 
given by c = ab. 
Scalar Inversion: a
−1
, the denotation of multiplicative inverse of any 
constituent element of Fp has the property a.a
−1
= 1. The Fermat's method or the 
extended Euclidean algorithm aid in its computation. 
• Point: A point may be defined as an ordered pair of scalars conforming to the 
elliptic curve equation. These elements are denoted by capital letter such as P1, 
P2, etc. An alternative notation for a point P1 is P1= (x,y) where both x and y 
belong to the field.  
• Point Addition: It is possible to obtain a third point R on the curve given two 
points P and Q with the aid of a set of rules. Such a possibility is termed elliptic 
curve point addition.  he symbol ‘ ’ represents the elliptic curve addition   =   
+ Q. Point addition is not to be confused with scalar addition. 
• Point Multiplication: kP denotes the multiplication of an elliptic curve point 
P by an integer k. This is analogous to the addition of P to itself k times and this 
results in another point on the curve. 
• Elliptic Curve Group: When the above discussed point addition operation is 
considered as a group operation, an additive group that consists of the set of the 
solutions of the elliptic curve equation and a special point called point-at-
infinity, is formed. 
The equation of E(Fp) can be defined as: 
y
2
 = x
3
 + ax + b,   (1) 
where p aFp and b Fp are constants such that: 
4a
3
 + 27b
2
 ≠ 0.             (2) 
An abelian group [15] is created with the set of points defined by the point addition 
extended by the point . For points on an elliptic curve, we define a certain 
addition, denoted ‘ ’.  he addition rules are given below. 
1)  + P = P and P +  = P, where  serves as the additive identity. 
2) P + (– P) = (– P) + P = , where – P is the negative point of P. 
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3) (P + Q) + R = P + (Q + R). 
4) P + Q = Q + P. 
 
For any two points P (x1,y1) and Q (x2,y2) over Ep(a,b), the elliptic curve addition 
operation, which is denoted as P+Q=R (x3,y3), where the coordinates x3 and y3 
satisfying: 
                                        x3=(t
2
-x1-x2) mod p,  
 
                                        y3=(t(x1-x3)-y2) mod p, 
Where the parameter t is given by: 
 
                   
1
2
1
2
3
y
ax   mod p, if P=Q 
       t =   
                                             
12
12
xx
yy


 mod p, if PQ 
 
 
3. THE PROPOSED BLIND SIGNATURE SCHEME 
In this section, we shall propose a novel efficient and low computation blind 
signature based on ECDLP. The underlying principles of the new blind signature 
scheme are explained using   two kinds of participants: a signer and a requester 
(user). A user requests signatures from the signer, and the signer computes and 
issues blind signatures to the user. The different phases of the proposed scheme are 
explained below. 
 n the initialization phase, the domain’s parameter is defined, and the signer 
publishes the necessary information. To obtain the signature of a message, the user 
submits a blinded version of the message to the signer in the request phase. In the 
signature generation phase, the signer signs the blinded message, and sends the 
result back to the user. Afterwards, the user extracts the signature in the extraction 
phase. During the verification phase, the validity of the declared signature is 
verified. We describe these five phases in the following: 
Initialization Phase   
Initially, some public parameters are generated. The signer specifies an 
appropriate elliptic curve (E) over the finite field Fp. Then, the base point is selected, 
which having the largest order n such that nG=. He declares the values E(Fp), G 
and n as public.  
In this phase, the private key and public key of the signer are generated using elliptic 
curve, i-e the signer chooses randomly an integer vs as the private key and computes 
the public key: Ps = vsG.  
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Moreover, the signer selects randomly an integer vFp. Then, he computes the point 
R1=vG and keeps the value of v secret. The signer then sends back the point R1 to 
the user. 
Requesting Phase 
 After receiving R1, the requester randomly selects an point K (k1,k2) into EC.  
Then its x-coordinate is used as blinding factor, which is Fp element. Therefore, the 
requester computes a point R having coordinates (x0,y0) as follows: 
      R=k1
-1
R1  (3) 
Note that k
-1
 indicates the inversion in the finite field [16]. If R is equal to , the 
requester has to reselect the blinding point K, and then recalculate R (3). 
After calculating r = x0mod n, the requester blinds the message m’ as: m’=k1rm+ k2 
and transmits m’ to the signer. 
Signing Phase:  he signer computes the blind signature s’ as: s’ = vsm’ v.  
So, the signer generates the signature parameter s’, then sends it to the re uester. 
Extraction Phase: the requester should do the followings to recover the real 
signature S after receiving the blinded signature s’ from the signer:     S = k1
-1s’G- 
k1
-1
k2Ps. 
Then, the requester declares the tuple (R,S) as the signature of the message m.  
Verifying Phase: The verifier verifies the signature as follows: 
                                                              S 
?
 rmPs+ R 
The validity of the signature (R,S) for a message m is verified as following: 
   S -R= k1
-1s’G - k1
-1
k2Ps - k1
-1
R1     
                  = k1
-1
 (vsm’ v G - k1
-1
k2Ps - k1
-1
R1 
                    = k1
-1
vsm’G   k1
-1
 (vG) - k1
-1
k2Ps - k1
-1
R1   
                                   = k1
-1
vs(k1rm + k2)G - k1
-1
k2Ps 
                                   = rm(vsG) + k1
-1
k2(vsG)-k1
-1
k2Ps 
                                                      = rmPs 
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The different phases are given as following: 
User          Signer       
 
 
 
              R1     
         
              m’                                                                      
                                                                                 s’ 
                
 
   
 
     Verifier 
 
 
Figure 1. Flow of the proposed blind signature scheme. 
 
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS  
4.1  Property of blind signature 
       In this section, we would like to examine that our scheme satisfies the properties 
that a blind signature should hold. The security of the proposed method is based on 
the difficulty of the ECDLP (Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem).  
- Blindness 
 The blinded message of our scheme is generated as m’=k1r(m) + k2 in the request 
phase, since the signer is unable to derive the message m without the value k1, k2 
and r. It is considered that equation (3) could not reveal any information about the 
blind factor since finding the blinding factors in this equation leads to solving 
ECDLP and this is infeasible. The signer can never find k1, k2 and r without the 
value of K, hence blindness property is correctly achieved. By the way, our scheme 
is satisfied the blindness property since the signer signs the blinded message and 
knows nothing about the true message. 
- Untraceability 
The signer cannot link the signature to the message as signer only has the 
information (v, R1, m’, s’  for each blind signature re uested. Therefore, without the 
Initialisation Phase 
Selects his private key vs 
randomly 
Declares Ps=vsG as his public key.  
Selects v randomly and computes 
R1= vG 
Requesting Phase 
Selects K (k1,k2) randomly as 
 K E(Fp) 
                         
Computes R=k1
-1
R1  
If R= then, re-select K 
   Otherwise, computes  
r =x0 mod n 
m’=k1rm+ k2  
Signing Phase 
Computes: 
       s’=vsm’ v Extraction Phase 
Computes: 
S=k1
-1s’G - k1
-1
k2Ps 
Publish: (R,S) 
Verification Phase  
Check S = rmPs +R ? 
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knowledge of the secret information of the requester (k1, k2, r), can not trace the 
blind signature. 
4.2.  Performance 
 In [4], the authors provide a novel untraceable blind signature scheme based on 
the ECDLP. Also, they declared that their blind signature scheme has a high 
performance compared to Camenisch and al [3].  
In this work, our purpose is to redure a computional cost in terms of Multiplication. 
In fact, we shall compare our scheme to other methods [3, 4] to find out our 
algorithm performance.  
In particular, we investigate the performance of the time complexity of various 
operation in terms of Multiplication (EXP: exponentiation, ECPM: multiplication in 
an elliptic curve point, MUL: Multiplication, ECPA: Addition of two points in an 
elliptic curve, ADD: Addition, INV: Inversion). Note that the time for computing 
modular addition is ignored, since it is much smaller than time for computing 
modular multiplication and modular inverse. 
The comparisons of computation costs between the proposed blind signature 
protocol and other schemes are summarized in Table 1. 
According to [17], the elliptic curve point multiplication needs 29TMUL, the 
elliptic curve point addition needs 0.12 TMUL and the modular exponentiation 
operation needs 240TMUL in termes of time complexity of a modular multiplication. 
The time complexities of the various schemes are illustrated in Table 1. The required 
computational cost for all schemes has been estimated by accumulating execution 
times of all the required operations.  
 
Table 1. Comparative analysis of computational overhead in terms of TMUL 
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Required 
Computation 
cost 
Scheme 
[3] 
7 - - 2 10 2 1696TMUL 
Scheme 
[4] 
- 7 3 1 6 3 203.57 TMUL 
Our 
scheme 
- 
 
6 2 1 6 2 180.31TMUL 
 
The above table shows the comparative analysis of the proposed scheme with the 
existing schemes [3, 4]. From this we may conclude that the proposed schemes give 
better result than all other schemes. In fact, our elliptic curve blind signature scheme 
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is as secure as the schemes [3] and [4]. But, our scheme is more efficient because it 
requires minimal operation performed by the user and signer in signing and thus 
makes it very efficient.    
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper suggests a novel blind signature scheme based on the Elliptic Curve 
Discrete Logarithm Problem. The scheme has been proved to be secure, robust and 
untraceable. The proposed scheme shows efficiency owing to lower storage 
requirements and computational overhead, which is due to the use of ECC. As the 
scheme is based on ECDLP, it achieves the same security with fewer bits key as 
compared to RSA. In addition, it has low-computation requirements. Besides, our 
scheme also satisfies the requirements of a blind signature scheme. Therefore, it can 
be efficiently applied to electronic cash payment systems or anonymous voting 
systems. 
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